

10 APR 90

COUNTRY: CHILE

SUBJ: DEVELOPING MILITARY ATTITUDES TOWARDS MILITARY/  
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT ISSUES  
DOI: EARLY APRIL 1990

AS OF APRIL 1990, MID-LEVEL OFFICERS OF THE ARMY INCREASINGLY ARE THINKING ARMY COMMANDER IN CHIEF (CINC) GENERAL AUGUSTO ((PINOCHET)) UGARTE SHOULD GIVE UP LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMY. THE ARMY "HARDLINERS" THAT GIVE PINOCHET UNQUESTIONING SUPPORT ARE BECOMING ISOLATED FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF THE INSTITUTION. ARMY PERSONNEL SEE THAT THE CHILEAN AIR FORCE AND NAVY ARE DEVELOPING POSITIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE GOVERNMENT, BUT SEE THE ARMY BEING SIDELINED. THE TENDENCY AMONG THE ARMY OFFICERS IS TO BLAME PINOCHET FOR THE BAD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

2. DESPITE THE INCREASING PROCLIVITY TO SEE PINOCHET AS A HINDRANCE TO ARMY RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT, THE ARMY FACES A COMPLICATING FACTOR. SINCE PINOCHET DID NOT APPOINT A SUCCESSOR BEFORE THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT, HE COULD NOT NOW LEAVE AND DETERMINE HIS SUCCESSOR. PRESIDENT PATRICIO ((AYLWIN)) AZOCAR WOULD BE ABLE TO SELECT THE NEW ARMY COMMANDER IN CHIEF FROM THE TOP FIVE MOST SENIOR ARMY GENERALS. THE ARMY WOULD PREFER TO AVOID THIS. FURTHERMORE, SOME OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT AS ARMY CINC, PINOCHET PROVIDES A SHIELD AGAINST MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE AREA OF INVESTIGATIONS AND ACCUSATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THEY SEE PINOCHET AS THE ONLY LEADER TOUGH ENOUGH TO PREVENT OFFICERS FROM BEING

BROUGHT TO TRIAL. GENERAL SENTIMENTS AMONG SENIOR AIR FORCE AND NAVY OFFICERS SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY WOULD NOT RESIST A GOVERNMENT PROGRAM TO INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. THE APPARENTLY PREVAILING VIEW IS THAT OPPOSITION WOULD ONLY SERVE TO DISCREDIT THE INSTITUTION AND ULTIMATELY FAIL ANYWAY.

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: WHILE THE ARMY COULD BE EXPECTED TO RESIST GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES AGAINST ARMY OFFICERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, THE KEY QUESTION IS HOW IT WOULD DO SO. A CLOSE STUDY OF THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE ARMY WOULD INDICATE THAT THE ARMY COULD THREATEN THE USE OF FORCE.

THE PROBLEM WITH THE THREAT OF THE USE OF FORCE, OF COURSE, IS THAT BY THREATENING THERE IS A POINT OF NO RETURN. UPON REACHING A POINT OF NO RETURN, A SPLIT WITHIN THE ARMY ITSELF WOULD BE LIKELY. A MORE MEASURED RESPONSE WOULD BE THROUGH INSTRUCTING ARMY PERSONNEL NOT TO COOPERATE WITH AN INVESTIGATION AND NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN OR ATTEND TRIALS AS WITNESSES, ACCUSED, ETC. THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT APPEAR INCLINED, HOWEVER, TO PUSH SO HARD AS TO CAUSE A CONFRONTATION WITH THE ARMED FORCES. THE RULING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) AND THE GOVERNMENT HAVE SHOWN RESTRAINT AND AN INCLINATION TO TRY TO REASON WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE MAKING STRONG DEMANDS.)

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE THAT PRESENTS ITSELF, BUT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN BROACHED EXCEPT BY THOSE ADVISORS BEGINNING TO LOOK FOR ORIGINAL SOLUTIONS, WOULD BE AN AMNESTY FOR BOTH SIDES. THAT IS, AN AMNESTY FOR ABUSES BY ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL AND AN AMNESTY FOR THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN ACCUSED AND PUNISHED FOR CRIMES THAT WERE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. THE GOVERNMENT COULD ALLOW THE LEFT TO BUILD UP PRESSURE IN DEMANDS RELATED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AND THEN TELL THE ARMED FORCES THAT A COMPLETE AMNESTY FOR BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE APPLIED AS THE ONLY VIABLE SOLUTION. A DRAWBACK TO SUCH A PLAN WOULD BE THAT IT WOULD BE STAUNCHLY RESISTED BY MILITARY HARDLINERS AND WOULD TEND TO BUTTRESS THEIR CAUSE.) [REDACTED] COMMENT: A NEW AMNESTY HAS BEEN MENTIONED. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT IS PROPOSING A PARDON FOR SOME "POLITICAL" PRISONERS.)

5. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]